The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) was adopted in 2017 and will enter into force in January 2021. The Treaty provides a first-ever unconditional global ban on the use of nuclear arms. Several Norwegian political parties, organisations, and individuals – including six former prime ministers, defence ministers, and foreign ministers – have voiced their support for the agreement. The government, for its part, has argued that ratification of the TPNW would contradict NATO and undermine Norway’s security and defence capability. Labour, Norway’s largest opposition party, has expressed support for Norwegian signature in the long term, but simultaneously suggested that adherence at present could reduce Norway’s access to influence and protection.
This report analyses nuclear policymaking in NATO, Norway’s role in allied cooperation, and the potential consequences of Norwegian adherence to the TPNW. The report is based on a mix of open sources, documents released from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on freedom of information requests, and six in-depth interviews with individuals with long experience from leadership positions in the Norwegian civil service and/or the Norwegian armed forces.
Nuclear weapons entered NATO strategy in the mid-1950s. In 1957, the United States suggested deploying American nuclear weapons in European countries as a means of offsetting the Soviet Union’s breakthroughs in long-range missile technology and assumed conventional superiority. Norwegian policymakers rejected the offer in favour of a continuation of the “no-foreign-bases policy” adopted in 1949.
Numerous experts and policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic have since the 1950s suggested that NATO’s “nuclear umbrella” lacks credibility. While politicians further south in Europe sought to bypass this credibility problem by accepting the deployment of thousands of highly “usable” US tactical nuclear weapons, Norwegian policymakers opted for a policy of détente. This policy was maintained for much of the Cold War period. Norwegian strategists and politicians believed close operational links to the United States’ nuclear war planning would make Norway a more likely target for Soviet nuclear weapons while at the same time fuelling a security dilemma in the High North.
NATO’s nuclear policy has since the 1970s been marked by two countervailing trends. On the one hand, the military role of nuclear weapons in the alliance’s practical defence planning has been substantially reduced. On the other, the political role of nuclear weapons as symbols of allied power and unity has been increased. This latter trend culminated in 2010, when allied leaders for the first time adopted a strategic concept defining NATO as a “nuclear alliance”. At the same time, the 2010 Strategic Concept also called on NATO members to help create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons.
Norwegian governments and political parties have at several points in time sought to foster disarmament, arms control, and changes to NATO posture through participation in formal and informal groupings within and outside of the alliance (Scandilux, NATO-5, various groupings seeking a reduction of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, etc.). This diplomatic activity, which has largely been limited to calling on the nuclear-armed states to change their ways, has had little effect.
The likely consequences of Norwegian adherence to the TPNW are contested. Norwegian authorities have suggested that ratification would conflict with allied cooperation in NATO, but it is not clear exactly how or why. Ratification would not obviously trigger significant legal consequences or changes to existing military practice. The TPNW will admittedly prohibit Norway from explicitly calling on the United States or other nuclear-armed states to use nuclear weapons on Norway’s behalf. Yet this possibility is largely of theoretical interest. The sources interviewed in the context of this study agreed that the United States, Britain, and France would almost certainly refrain from using their nuclear weapons unless their own and most vital national security interests were threatened. The nuclear part of the NATO security guarantee is in this view not credible and therefore of little value as a deterrent.
The main obstacle to Norwegian signature of the TPNW is political. The major powers – both within NATO and outside – do not want their nuclear weapons to be delegitimised in international affairs. In addition, the current security environment, perceived by many as particularly difficult, have led policymakers to value NATO unity even more highly than they did one or two decades ago. Norwegian adherence to the TPNW is likely to trigger political reprisals from allies, but it is disputed how serious these will be. Their extent will likely depend on timing, and on whether the most influential members of NATO are keen to make an issue out of the TPNW. The major powers in NATO do not have an interest in loosing Norway or other strategically located partners as allies. 
NATO’s most important forum for nuclear policymaking is the consensus-oriented North Atlantic Council. Consultations on nuclear policy also take place in the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) and its subsidiary organs, the NPG Staff Group and High Level Group (HLG). There is little if any evidence that Norway has ever enjoyed meaningful influence on the nuclear-armed states’ policies within these forums. Norway’s influence on the NATO nuclear powers’ policies is already exceedingly low, and will thus not be significantly reduced by adherence to the TPNW or an exit from the NPG and its subsidiary organs. 
A potential negative consequence of adherence to the TPNW and attendant exit from the NPG and its subsidiary organs is that Norwegian authorities lose access to expertise and insight on nuclear threats. After all, some of the nuclear expertise within the Norwegian state apparatus is currently linked to Norway’s participation in the NPG and its subsidiary organs. To ameliorate this, any decision to adhere to the TPNW and exit the NPG should be accompanied by a conscious decision to retain Norwegian expertise on issues of nuclear policy, strategy, and security. The experts interviewed for this study identified three central nuclear threats to Norway in the current security environment: (1) Norway as the site of “limited” nuclear war; (2) use of nuclear weapons as a result of accidents or misunderstandings; (3) attacks and escalation around the Russian North Fleet at the Kola peninsula. Adherence to the TPNW would likely have relatively insignificant impact on these threats in the short term.
Read the full report (in Norwegian) here.

 Nuclear non-proliferation is a fundamentally European issue which is not yet part of any EU agenda
Erkki Tuomio
​https://ecfr.eu/article/it-is-time-to-end-our-reliance-on-nuclear-weapons/
Published on the 2nd November 2020, European Council on Foreign Relations

In July 2017, an overwhelming majority of the UN General Assembly adopted a landmark global agreement to ban nuclear weapons, known as the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Ratification by the fiftieth country took place this year, on the day the United Nations celebrated its 75th anniversary. The treaty will now enter into force in 90 days’ time. Those countries that have ratified the treaty include Austria, Ireland, and Malta – three member states of the European Union – and it is to be hoped that others in Europe will soon follow.Finland did not participate in the negotiations leading up to the treaty, and it did not vote for it. Public opinion is, however, in favour of the treaty, with one poll showing that 84 per cent of Finns would support signing up. Three parties in Finland’s coalition government also want the country to join. Foreign ministry officials have argued in hearings of the Finnish parliament’s Foreign Relations Committee that joining would weaken the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) – a faulty reasoning that the Committee unanimously rejected.

It is worth quoting at length the statement published on 21 September this year by 56 former leaders and foreign or defence ministers of NATO and US ally countries, including two former NATO secretaries-general:

“The prohibition treaty is an important reinforcement to the half-century-old Non-Proliferation Treaty, which, though remarkably successful in curbing the spread of nuclear weapons to more countries, has failed to establish a universal taboo against the possession of nuclear weapons. The five nuclear-armed nations that had nuclear weapons at the time of the NPT’s negotiation — the United States, Russia, Britain, France and China — apparently view it as a licence to retain their nuclear forces in perpetuity. Instead of disarming, they are investing heavily in upgrades to their arsenals, with plans to retain them for many decades to come. This is patently unacceptable.”

It is precisely the frustration at the lack of progress with nuclear disarmament – to which the nuclear weapons states committed themselves in the grand bargain to get the non-nuclear countries to accept the NPT treaty signed in 1968 – that gave decisive impetus to the prohibition treaty. Obviously, without the participation of the nuclear weapons states, not one nuclear weapon will be dismantled. But without pressure from the non-nuclear weapons states in the form of this treaty, neither will they engage in serious efforts at disarmament. Nuclear weapons states will instead continue the present trend of modernising existing and developing new nuclear weapons systems.

The risk of accidental or miscalculated nuclear weapon use may today be even greater than at the height of the cold war

Support in NATO countries for doing away with all weapons of mass destruction is growing, as evidenced by the signatories to the statement above. This is important because one argument made in Finland and Sweden, although it is rarely made in public, for opposing joining the prohibition treaty is the displeasure the US would show at such a step, which could hinder the deepening of these countries’ partnership relations with NATO. Given the growing demand in non-nuclear NATO countries to sign the treaty this is just as spurious as the NPT argument against joining.

The time has come for all states in the world to bring an end to the misguided, illegitimate, and immoral reliance on nuclear weapons. An all-out nuclear war is a threat to human life as a whole and would immediately bring about all the disasters we are trying to avoid with our efforts to curtail climate change and implement the Sustainable Development Goals of Agenda 2030.

No responsible leader disputes this. Yet we continue to conduct exercises in preparation for a nuclear war. The risk of accidental or miscalculated nuclear weapon use may today be even greater than at the height of the cold war. The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons is, as the statement quoted says, “a beacon of hope in a time of darkness”.

There is one nuclear weapons state in the EU (formerly two) and 21 EU member states in NATO, but nuclear weapons and related issues have never formed part of the EU’s agenda. This is a fundamentally European issue, given the likelihood that Europe would face the greatest level of destruction in the event of a conflict and because of the European preference for achieving change through rules-based processes. All EU member states should address it and join the treaty banning all nuclear weapons. Three member states in the EU have already done so; others should follow them.

Erkki Tuomioja is ECFR member and former Minister for Foreign Affairs in Finland.

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  In July 2017, an overwhelming majority of the UN General Assembly adopted a landmark global agreement to ban nuclear weapons, known as the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Ratification by the fiftieth country took place this year, on the day the United Nations celebrated its 75th anniversary. The treaty will now enter into force in 90 days’ time. Those countries that have ratified the treaty include Austria, Ireland, and Malta – three member states of the European Union – and it is to be hoped that others in Europe will soon follow.
  Finland did not participate in the negotiations leading up to the treaty, and it did not vote for it. Public opinion is, however, in favour of the treaty, with one poll showing that 84 per cent of Finns would support signing up. Three parties in Finland’s coalition government also want the country to join. Foreign ministry officials have argued in hearings of the Finnish parliament’s Foreign Relations Committee that joining would weaken the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) – a faulty reasoning that the Committee unanimously rejected.
  It is worth quoting at length the statement published on 21 September this year by 56 former leaders and foreign or defence ministers of NATO and US ally countries, including two former NATO secretaries-general:
  “The prohibition treaty is an important reinforcement to the half-century-old Non-Proliferation Treaty, which, though remarkably successful in curbing the spread of nuclear weapons to more countries, has failed to establish a universal taboo against the possession of nuclear weapons. The five nuclear-armed nations that had nuclear weapons at the time of the NPT’s negotiation — the United States, Russia, Britain, France and China — apparently view it as a licence to retain their nuclear forces in perpetuity. Instead of disarming, they are investing heavily in upgrades to their arsenals, with plans to retain them for many decades to come. This is patently unacceptable.”
  It is precisely the frustration at the lack of progress with nuclear disarmament – to which the nuclear weapons states committed themselves in the grand bargain to get the non-nuclear countries to accept the NPT treaty signed in 1968 – that gave decisive impetus to the prohibition treaty. Obviously, without the participation of the nuclear weapons states, not one nuclear weapon will be dismantled. But without pressure from the non-nuclear weapons states in the form of this treaty, neither will they engage in serious efforts at disarmament. Nuclear weapons states will instead continue the present trend of modernising existing and developing new nuclear weapons systems.
  The risk of accidental or miscalculated nuclear weapon use may today be even greater than at the height of the cold war
  Support in NATO countries for doing away with all weapons of mass destruction is growing, as evidenced by the signatories to the statement above. This is important because one argument made in Finland and Sweden, although it is rarely made in public, for opposing joining the prohibition treaty is the displeasure the US would show at such a step, which could hinder the deepening of these countries’ partnership relations with NATO. Given the growing demand in non-nuclear NATO countries to sign the treaty this is just as spurious as the NPT argument against joining.
  The time has come for all states in the world to bring an end to the misguided, illegitimate, and immoral reliance on nuclear weapons. An all-out nuclear war is a threat to human life as a whole and would immediately bring about all the disasters we are trying to avoid with our efforts to curtail climate change and implement the Sustainable Development Goals of Agenda 2030.
  No responsible leader disputes this. Yet we continue to conduct exercises in preparation for a nuclear war. The risk of accidental or miscalculated nuclear weapon use may today be even greater than at the height of the cold war. The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons is, as the statement quoted says, “a beacon of hope in a time of darkness”.
  There is one nuclear weapons state in the EU (formerly two) and 21 EU member states in NATO, but nuclear weapons and related issues have never formed part of the EU’s agenda. This is a fundamentally European issue, given the likelihood that Europe would face the greatest level of destruction in the event of a conflict and because of the European preference for achieving change through rules-based processes. All EU member states should address it and join the treaty banning all nuclear weapons. Three member states in the EU have already done so; others should follow them.
  Erkki Tuomioja is ECFR member and former Minister for Foreign Affairs in Finland.
  
  The European Council on Foreign Relations does not take collective positions. ECFR publications only represent the views of its individual authors.
  
  AUTHORErkki Tuomioja
  
  WhatsApp

In July 2017, an overwhelming majority of the UN General Assembly adopted a landmark global agreement to ban nuclear weapons, known as the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Ratification by the fiftieth country took place this year, on the day the United Nations celebrated its 75th anniversary. The treaty will now enter into force in 90 days’ time. Those countries that have ratified the treaty include Austria, Ireland, and Malta – three member states of the European Union – and it is to be hoped that others in Europe will soon follow.
Finland did not participate in the negotiations leading up to the treaty, and it did not vote for it. Public opinion is, however, in favour of the treaty, with one poll showing that 84 per cent of Finns would support signing up. Three parties in Finland’s coalition government also want the country to join. Foreign ministry officials have argued in hearings of the Finnish parliament’s Foreign Relations Committee that joining would weaken the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) – a faulty reasoning that the Committee unanimously rejected.
It is worth quoting at length the statement published on 21 September this year by 56 former leaders and foreign or defence ministers of NATO and US ally countries, including two former NATO secretaries-general:
“The prohibition treaty is an important reinforcement to the half-century-old Non-Proliferation Treaty, which, though remarkably successful in curbing the spread of nuclear weapons to more countries, has failed to establish a universal taboo against the possession of nuclear weapons. The five nuclear-armed nations that had nuclear weapons at the time of the NPT’s negotiation — the United States, Russia, Britain, France and China — apparently view it as a licence to retain their nuclear forces in perpetuity. Instead of disarming, they are investing heavily in upgrades to their arsenals, with plans to retain them for many decades to come. This is patently unacceptable.”
It is precisely the frustration at the lack of progress with nuclear disarmament – to which the nuclear weapons states committed themselves in the grand bargain to get the non-nuclear countries to accept the NPT treaty signed in 1968 – that gave decisive impetus to the prohibition treaty. Obviously, without the participation of the nuclear weapons states, not one nuclear weapon will be dismantled. But without pressure from the non-nuclear weapons states in the form of this treaty, neither will they engage in serious efforts at disarmament. Nuclear weapons states will instead continue the present trend of modernising existing and developing new nuclear weapons systems.
The risk of accidental or miscalculated nuclear weapon use may today be even greater than at the height of the cold war
Support in NATO countries for doing away with all weapons of mass destruction is growing, as evidenced by the signatories to the statement above. This is important because one argument made in Finland and Sweden, although it is rarely made in public, for opposing joining the prohibition treaty is the displeasure the US would show at such a step, which could hinder the deepening of these countries’ partnership relations with NATO. Given the growing demand in non-nuclear NATO countries to sign the treaty this is just as spurious as the NPT argument against joining.
The time has come for all states in the world to bring an end to the misguided, illegitimate, and immoral reliance on nuclear weapons. An all-out nuclear war is a threat to human life as a whole and would immediately bring about all the disasters we are trying to avoid with our efforts to curtail climate change and implement the Sustainable Development Goals of Agenda 2030.
No responsible leader disputes this. Yet we continue to conduct exercises in preparation for a nuclear war. The risk of accidental or miscalculated nuclear weapon use may today be even greater than at the height of the cold war. The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons is, as the statement quoted says, “a beacon of hope in a time of darkness”.
There is one nuclear weapons state in the EU (formerly two) and 21 EU member states in NATO, but nuclear weapons and related issues have never formed part of the EU’s agenda. This is a fundamentally European issue, given the likelihood that Europe would face the greatest level of destruction in the event of a conflict and because of the European preference for achieving change through rules-based processes. All EU member states should address it and join the treaty banning all nuclear weapons. Three member states in the EU have already done so; others should follow them.
Erkki Tuomioja is ECFR member and former Minister for Foreign Affairs in Finland.

The European Council on Foreign Relations does not take collective positions. ECFR publications only represent the views of its individual authors.

AUTHORErkki Tuomioja